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Abstract
Although studies on environmental conflicts have engaged with the subject of
violence, a multidimensional approach has been lacking. Using data from 95
environmental conflicts in Central America, we show how different forms of
violence appear and overlap. We focus on direct, structural, cultural, slow,
and ecological forms of violence. Results suggest that the common
understanding of violence in environmental conflicts as a direct event in time
and space is only the tip of the iceberg and that violence can reach not only
environmental defenders, but also communities, nature, and the sustainability
of their relations.
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Introduction
Grassroot organizations and individuals protest and denounce situations of
social and environmental damages leading to environmental conflicts (or
ecological distribution conflicts) (Martinez-Alier 1995, 2002). In their struggles
to save water and land, their livelihoods, their future, and the future of the next
generations, many of them are threatened, wounded, killed, criminalized, and
forced to leave their communities (Edelman and León 2013; Aguilar-Støen
2015; Mingorría 2017; Rasch 2017).
Global Witness, an international organization working on environmental abuses
and human rights since 1993, has highlighted that during 2015, more than three
environmental defenders  were assassinated every week around the world
(Global Witness 2016). In most cases, culprits escape unpunished (Global
Witness 2014, 2016). Concerned with this, and aiming to move beyond their
analysis, in this article, we look at how different forms of violence appear and
overlap in environmental conflicts; our objective is to propose a wider
conception of violence, in which we consider not only its visible forms, but also
violence as unseen processes, whose effect reaches beyond humans.
To do so, we use a database of 95 environmental conflicts  from seven Central
American countries (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, and Panama) from the Environmental Justice Atlas database
(http://www.ejatlas.org). Central America hosts important biological and
cultural diversity, and due to its geological formation, it represents a biological
corridor between North and South America with only 0.1% of the world’s land
mass yet 7% of the world’s biodiversity. The region has a population of
47,667,000 inhabitants (2016), around 80 indigenous and afro-descendant
groups and 60 different languages.
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Central America is relevant for studies on violence in environmental conflicts.
First, Global Witness (2016) already identified the region as one of the most
violent around the world for environmental defenders. Second, an analysis of
the whole region using data for the seven countries as we do here is still
lacking. Third, because it is a socially, politically, and economically
heterogeneous region in which diverse characteristics such as a complex history
of war and peace play a role in current environmental struggles (Wayland and
Kuniholm 2015). In addition, the presence of environmental racism is related to
the percentage of indigenous population in each country, for instance, while in
Guatemala, 60% of the total population is indigenous, and in Costa Rica, the
percentage is around 2%. Finally, because this heterogeneity reinforces the idea
that just because violence is not visible, it does not mean that a country does not
experience violence, thus necessitating a multidimensional violence approach.
The article is divided as follows. Section 2 briefly describes Central America’s
socio-economic background. Section 3 presents a theoretical background on
violence and environmental conflicts. Section 4 describes the EJAtlas as a tool
to analyze environmental conflicts, and the methods used to gather and analyze
how violence appear in these conflicts. Based on regional tendencies and local
examples, Sect. 5 synthesizes and discusses the main findings in how different
forms of violence appear and overlap. In Sect. 6, we insists on the need for a
multidimensional violence approach to address the study of environmental
conflicts and in which violence is defined as an action or a process that appears
in visible and unseen forms against humans, nature, and the sustainability of
their relations. In addition, we show how violence is not always a response
against resistance, but that resistance can also be organized in response to a
long-term process of violence. In Sect. 7, we lay out our conclusions.
Central American background: common traits and
differences
Latin American history is marked by the plunder of raw materials, inequality,
power asymmetries, and violence (Acosta 2009; Bebbington and Bury 2013;
Machado 2014; Svampa 2013), and Central America is not an exception. The
legacy of colonial and neo-colonial relations, the peace and war historical traits,
the external and political influence of the USA (Faber 1992), China as a new
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economic actor in the region (Urcuyo 2014; McKay et al. 2016), and the
increase of drug trafficking routes (McSweeney et al. 2014) are some of the
current realities that superpose with extractive industries, pollution,
environmental conflicts, and violence.
The establishment of the United Fruit Company (UFCo) in 1899 marks the
beginning of an era of neo-colonial relations. Through the International
Railways of Central America (IRCA), the company controlled commercial
routes and productive lands in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Nicaragua. These countries were nicknamed “Banana Republics” —a pejorative
concept to describe poor, small, dependent, and politically unstable nations. For
decades, the UFCO promoted enclave economies and influenced governmental
decisions for its own benefit (Bucheli 2008).
In much more recent times, geopolitical programs and trade agreements
continue to threaten communities at a local level (Grandia 2006). For instance,
the Central American Electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC) under
“Mesoamerica Project” (2008) for energy exportation has had an effect on the
increase of hydroelectric dam projects (Stenzel 2006). In Guatemala, indigenous
Maya-Q’eqchi have protested against the Xalalá dam (EJatlas 2016a) claiming
for the protection of the sacred hills that it would flood. In Belize, local
communities have been concerned about the loss of biodiversity in the Macal
River due to the Chalillo dam (EJatlas 2016b). These two cases—recorded in
the EJAtlas—are part of SIEPAC. By ignoring the sacredness of the indigenous
environment and failing to recognize local demands, governments have
supported these projects under the idea of “national interest” and
“development” (EJatlas 2016a, b).
Furthermore, since the signature of diplomatic relations with Costa Rica in
2007, China has kept an eye on the region. One of its interests is to have access
to both Atlantic and Pacific oceans for commerce route expansion (Urcuyo
2014). Though investments in extractive, energy, and transport industries, China
capitals, go to Central America sources, sometimes without considering
environmental, labor, and social conditions (McKay et al. 2016). Key examples
on the EJAtlas are Sinohydro’s presence which is becoming common in
hydroelectric dam conflicts (EJatlas 2014a, 2017a) and the interoceanic Gran
Canal in Nicaragua (EJatlas 2014b).
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Moreover, the region is also strategic for drug traffickers, since it connects
producers (South America) to consumers (North America), and to increase
terrestrial routes, the illegal activity has led to “narco-deforestation”
(McSweeney et al. 2014). Trafficking has a relation with extractive industries
and environmental damage, since in some cases, traffickers incorporate the
illegal income into the legal economy through the investment on lands for
cattle, timber, and oil-palm plantations (McSweeney et al. 2014).
Despite commonalities across countries, Central America is very
heterogeneous. The consequences of its peace and war history and the gaps
between relevant social and economic indicators between countries are some
examples of this diversity. During the 1960s and 1990s, some countries were
marked as the confrontation stage of popular movements, armed struggles, and
repressive regimes (Brockett 2005). Civil war in Guatemala (1960–1995), El
Salvador (1979–1992), and Nicaragua (1962–1990) which resulted in 255,000
deaths and thousands of people forcibly disappeared are notorious examples.
The strongest guerrilla in El Salvador was called “Farabundo Martí” from the
name of the leader of an insurrection in 1932 that ended with tens of thousands
of peasant victims, while in Guatemala, the memory of the failed land reform
against UFCO because of a military coup in 1954 sponsored by the United
States was still fresh. In the wars of the 1960s and 1970s, the victims were
mostly from rural areas, affecting indigenous and peasant livelihoods (Kay
2001; Azpuru 1999). Some environmental conflicts mapped on the EJatlas date
from the civil war. In 1982, to make possible the construction of the Chixoy
Dam in Guatemala, the army and paramilitary forces murdered 444 indigenous
Mayan people, the majority of them women and children, these facts were later
known as the Río Negro massacre (EJatlas 2015a). The Esquipulas Peace
Agreement signed in 1987 was followed by a proliferation of extractive
industries. In post-war Guatemala, the government opened the country to
mining concessions (Wayland and Kuniholm 2015). In this scenario of open
violence and war, Costa Rica was an exception; its history of peace and
democracy began in 1948 when the government abolished the army. During this
later period, Panama had a military government until the US briefly invaded the
country in 1989 and Belize was still part of the British Empire until it reached
its independence in 1981.
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Overall, Central America’s economy is based in the primary sector (export of
raw materials) which is consistent with other Latin American countries.
However, Panama’s and Costa Rica’s economies are based on the third sector
(services economy). Table 1 shows social and economic indicators per country.
Table 1
Social and economic indicators in Central American countries.
Source: data from the Economist (2016) and Jahan (2016)
 
World Rank
Human
Development
Index (HDI)
Population living
below the income
poverty line, PPP
$1.90 a day (%)
Democracy
Index
(from 0 to
10) (2016)
Homicide
rate (per
100,000
people)
Belize 103 n.a n.a 34.4
Costa
Rica 66 1.6 7.88 10.0
El
Salvador 117 3 6.64 64.2
Guatemala 125 9.3 5.92 31.2
Honduras 130 16 5.92 74.6
Nicaragua 124 6.2 4.81 11.5
Panamá 60 3.8 7.13 17.4
Costa Rica and Panama have the highest Human Development Index in the
region and Guatemala and Honduras the lowest. Costa Rica and Panama have
the smallest percentage of population living the below income poverty line and
(again) Guatemala and Honduras the highest. A gap can also be seen regarding
poverty: while CR has 1.6% of its pop living below the poverty line, the value
reaches 16% in the case of Honduras. The Democracy Index is higher in Costa
Rica (7.88) and Panama (7.13) and lower in Nicaragua (4.81). The homicide
rate is higher in Honduras (74.6) and lower in Costa Rica (10). This accounts
for a very heterogeneous region. Overall, the Northern Triangle (Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador) has been seen as one of the most violent regions in
the world with a combination of strong elites, inequality, and weak institutions
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(Bull 2014; Van Bronkhorst and Demombynes 2010). These indicators may also
be considered a reflection of violence. The next section closely examines
different theoretical approaches on the phenomenon and concept of violence.
Theoretical background: violence and
environmental conflicts
Studies on violence
Why and how violence emerges has been addressed by scholars from different
disciplines. For Peace and Conflict studies, there is a “triangle” with three
corners from which violence can start (Galtung 1990). The first corner is direct
violence, defined as an event in time and space that is brutal and visible, where
perpetrators are human beings (a homicide, for example) (Galtung 1969). The
second corner is structural violence. It refers to a process that occurs when
social structures undermine individual wellbeing, especially towards
discriminated groups as a result of social inequalities and institutional failings
such as corruption or poverty (Galtung 1969). This form is less visible than the
former and there is no one directly to be blamed except for the entire political
and economic structure. The last form is cultural violence, and it indicates the
use of cultural elements (religion, ideology, language, science, and technology)
to legitimize structural and direct forms of violence. The Xalalà and Chalillo
dam projects in Guatemala and Belize in the name of “development” and
“national interest” are two key examples of this (EJatlas 2016a, b).
As with Galtung, Nixon was also concerned in expanding the concept of what
constitutes violence (beyond its direct form). In addition, like structural
violence, his concept of “slow violence” refers to a process. However, it
differentiates as it poses questions of “time, movement and change” (Nixon
2011:11). Slow violence refers to a delayed destruction dispersed across time
and space that is incremental, accumulative, and exponential (Nixon 2011). This
is the case of climate change, deforestation, and ocean acidification. The
persistent accumulated toxic effects on human health because of pollution from
heavy metals in open cast mining contexts, or because of the use of damaging
chemicals such as pesticides and herbicides are also examples. This form of
violence can remain unseen until its accumulative impacts become visible; that
is why (and contrary to direct violence), it is difficult for the victims to identify
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it, to protest and resist against it (Nixon 2011). It is similar to the concept of
“slow murder” to describe the health effects of heavy urban traffic pollution in
Delhi or the effects of spreading endosulfan in cashew plantations in Kerala.
“Slow murder” is a concept that the Centre for Sciences and Environment in
India has used for many years (Narain 2007). Endosulfan would of course
“slowly murder” both humans and other “innocent” biological entities apart
from those targeted.
Nixon refers to a delayed destruction and its environmental aftermaths—using
deforestation among other examples—but he mostly focuses on the impact of
slow violence on poor and supposedly disposable people. Because of that, we
find it relevant to bring into the debate the concept of “ecological violence”, a
term aiming to make the violence against the biophysical world and its
interrelations visible (Watts 2001). Cases of “ecocide”, a word coined to
“denounce the environmental destructions and potential damage of the spraying
of the Agent Orange in Vietnam” (Zierler 2011) are an example. In addition, the
“non-focused” deaths or “deaths by indirection” (Carson 1962) to describe how
the biocides (instead of insecticides) were poisoning not only enemy insects,
but other insects and all forms of life.
As Nixon and Galtung pointed out, there is an issue of inequality, as these
forms of violence commonly have an unequal distribution of their effects. Poor
and disadvantaged people and nature are the most affected. Through the study
of environmental conflicts, we link forms of violence, inequality, and
resistance. An ecological distribution conflict—interchangeable with
environmental conflict (see Scheidel et al. 2017 this feature)—is defined as
“collective manifestation of discontent that detonates when people organize
themselves, to denounce situations regarding not only unequal distribution of
environmental benefits but also unequal distribution of the environmental costs”
(Martinez-Alier and O’Connor 1996).
The concept of ‘Violent Environments’ (Peluso and Watts 2001) intersects the
study of environmental conflicts, violence, and power relations. Under this
notion, ‘environment’ is defined as “an arena of contested entitlements where
claims over property, assets, labor, and politics of recognition are played out”
(Peluso and Watts 2001: 25). In addition, “violence” is defined as a
“phenomenon deeply rooted in local histories and social relations but also
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connected to transitional processes of material change, political power relations
and historical conjuncture” (Peluso and Watts 2001: 29–30). In the following
section, we describe the EJAtlas as a tool for the study of environmental
conflicts and the different variables used to understand how violence manifests
in different environmental conflicts and countries.
Methodology
The EJAtlas is a large-scale database to gather and analyze environmental
conflicts around the world (Temper et al. 2015). The unit of analysis is an
economic project (a mining project, an oil extraction project, a hydroelectric
dam, a tree plantation, among others) which causes visible or potential socio-
environmental damage and where impacted people at a local level (but
sometimes at a national or regional level) organize themselves to protest against
such projects and resist with different mobilization forms. The information
gathered on the EJAtlas is the result of collaborative mapping between
academics and activists and sometimes also the people most directly affected
(Temper et al. 2015).
Methods used to gather information
In selecting the Central American cases, we used a snowball sampling method,
asking environmental justice experts  which cases in the region were the most
relevant to enter into the EJAtlas. With this in mind, we made a general list of
conflicts based on secondary sources (academic and non-academic articles such
as newspapers and websites of environmental defenders’ organizations). Then,
we shared the list with experts to validate these cases while asking them to
identify other ones. Subsequently, we entered the cases based on secondary
sources as well as information previously provided by experts. Data were
gathered during the period 2014–2017; in total, it includes 95 environmental
conflicts that span nine different types.
Furthermore, the authors of this paper have been engaged for many years in
diverse environmental struggles in the region so access to experts was made
through personal contacts. This paper’s first author made field trips in 2014 and
2015 to Belize, Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica to get feedback and to
gather information about less known cases. Often, activists directly involved in
4
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the conflict filled in the EJAtlas data sheets based on their own experience and
knowledge.
Variables from the EJAtlas used to analyze information
The EJAtlas data sheet has over 100 different variables to compare and analyze
(Martinez-Alier et al. 2016). First, to describe conflicts we used “type of
conflict”,  “date of beginning of the conflict”, “area of impact (rural, urban, and
semi-urban)”, and “mobilizing groups”. To analyze violence, we first chose the
variable “intensity of the conflict” which includes latent level (nonvisible
organizing), low level (some local organizing), medium level, (street protests
and visible mobilization), and high level (widespread mass mobilization,
violence in its direct form and arrests, and deaths of demonstrators or activists).
We also revised the variables called “impacts” and “outcomes of the conflict”.
We placed different variables in Table 2 depending on the definition of violence
according to different authors. As it can be perceived, some variables can be
placed in more than one form of violence.
Table 2
Variables (not mutually exclusive) from the EJAtlas according to type of violence
Form of
violence Definition Variables from the EJAtlas
Direct
violence
An event in a specific time and
space that is brutal and visible
(Galtung 1969)
Murders: selective
assassinations of environmental
defenders
Criminalization:
unsubstantiated accusations of
environmental defenders to
demobilize them from their
campaign
Repression: massive coercion
in a social protest
Targeting of activists: direct
attack aiming to cause physical
and psychological damage,
death threats
Structural
violence
Social structures affecting
individual wellbeing, especially
towards discriminated groups, as
a result of social inequalities and
Institutional arena/judicial
activism: institutional failings
endangering environmental
defenders
Court decision (failure for
environmental justice)
5
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institutional failings (Galtung
1969)
Criminalization:
unsubstantiated accusations of
environmental defenders to
demobilize them from their
campaign
Cultural
violence
The use of cultural elements
(religion, ideology, language) to
legitimize structural and direct
violence (Galtung 1990)
Impact on and lack of
participation of historical
discriminated groups
(indigenous and afro-
descendant’s groups)
Slow
violence
Delayed destruction dispersed
across time and space that is
incremental and accumulative
(Nixon 2011)
Exposure to unknown and/or
uncertain complex risks
Deaths (conversely to murders
these are deaths by indirection,
for example through an illness
caused by a long-term exposure
to an hazardous substance)
Water pollution
Air pollution
Soil contamination
Ecological
violence
Violence focusing on nature, on
the biophysical world and its
interrelations (Watts 2001)
Biodiversity loss
Deforestation
Water pollution
Air pollution
Soil contamination
Table 2 shows a categorization of variables from the EJAtlas according to the
type of violence. However, this relation is not so straight forward;
environmental conflicts are complex as is the way violence manifests in them.
Who are the main actors (both perpetrators and victims)? How is resistance
organized? How do the social structures from different countries shape these
forms of violence? Can ecological violence can be both direct and slow? How
slow is slow violence? In the next section, we will address these questions by
examining both regional trends and local examples from the seven countries.
Results: how does violence manifest in
environmental conflicts?
The time span of start dates for mapped conflicts in Central America extends
from 1959 to 2015. From the total of cases, 70% occurred in rural areas, 15% in
semi-urban, and 10% in urban areas. The rest occurred offshore—such as the oil
drilling case in the Blue Hole in Belize (EJatlas 2015b). The most common
types are mining extraction (27 cases), water management—mostly
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hydroelectric dam projects—(23 cases), and biomass and land conflicts—due to
monoculture expansion—(17 cases). Infrastructure and built environment,
industrial and utilities, and waste management conflicts are less common.
Figure 1 situates the conflicts by type and intensity level (high, medium, low,
and latent).
Fig. 1
Environmental conflicts per country by type of conflict and intensity level.
Source: the authors, based on EJAtlas data
Most of the conflicts are “high-level intensity” (around 46%) followed by
“medium level” (42%) and low level (10%) and only one case (in Honduras) is
“latent intensity”. Minerals’ Extraction and Water Management is the most
common and most highly-intense types of conflicts. Guatemala and Honduras
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are the countries in which—no matter the type of conflict—there are more high-
intensity cases. Tourism recreation conflicts are mostly categorized as medium
or low-level intensity; however, there is an exception in Honduras, where
Garifuna people defend their ancestral lands against a mega-tourist project and
a golf course (EJatlas 2014c). In addition, the only high-intensity conflict from
fossil fuels and climate justice is located in Guatemala, while the rest are
medium level intensity (EJatlas 2015b). Regarding resistance in these conflicts,
Fig. 1 also shows how some conflicts overlap offering multifold resistance to
more than one project at the same time. The following section explores key
examples of different dimensions of violence along Central America. When
possible, we identify the actors involved in deploying violence, the victims, and
their resistance.
Direct violence
The murder of at least one environmental defender appears in 27% of the cases,
violent targeting in 37%, repression in 37%, and criminalization in 38%. Data
by country illustrate substantial differences. Guatemala and Honduras seem to
be the most directly violent as they make up 79% of the total of cases in which
a murder has occurred. Even if the EJAtlas does not specifically count the
number of murders by conflict, some asymmetries are relevant to note. The
number of murders ranges from one such as in the case of Jeanette Kawas in
Honduras (EJatlas 2017b) to at least 444, in the Rio Negro massacre (EJatlas
2015a), while other cases such as the expansion of oil palm in Bajo Aguán,
Honduras reported 93 murders (EJatlas 2014d).
Variables on direct violence are not mutually exclusive, and it is common that
an assassination is preceded by violent targeting and death threats. One of the
most illustrative cases is the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam in Honduras
(EJatlas 2017a), a project affecting and displacing Lenca indigenous people
from the sacred river Gualcarque. During a protest in 2013, the community
leader Tomás García was shot dead and his son was wounded. Years after, in
2016, Berta Cáceres—who won the world famous Goldman Prize for
environmentalism in 2015—was shot to death in her home. Due to her active
role against the hydroelectric dam and other extractive projects in Honduras,
she previously had received threats against her life (Global Witness 2015).
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Another such case is located in El Salvador, where six environmental defenders
were killed. The victims (a pregnant woman included) were activists against the
El Dorado-Pacific Rim mining project (EJatlas 2017c). Some other female
environmental defenders murdered include Alicia Recinos Sorto (El Salvador,
2009), María Enriqueta Matute (Honduras, 2013), Rosalinda Pérez (Guatemala,
2015), Lesbia Yaneth (Honduras, 2016), and Laura Lorena Vásquez
(Guatemala, 2017). In addition, in Panama, during a protest in 2012, violent
repression by the police left three environmental defenders dead and more than
one hundred wounded. Ngäbe-Buglé indigenous, where protesting against Barro
Blanco Hydroelectric Dam Project (EJatlas 2016c) arguing that this project
violates the laws that define their territories, water rights, and self-
determination.
In general, direct violence is used as a premeditated act to intimidate and
demobilize environmental defenders from their resistance. Who the main
culprits are often remains unknown and most of these cases remain in impunity
(Global Witness 2016); nonetheless, families of the victims and other
environmental defenders accuse landowners, foremen, policemen, and goons
paid by companies as the main actors.
Traits of structural and cultural violence
In direct violence, governmental institutions fail to ensure justice by passively
ignoring and not investigating these murders. However, institutions can also
actively play a role in these conflicts through structural and cultural violence.
Environmental defenders appeal to State institutions to carry out their actions in
the conflict in 50% of the cases; at times, this form of mobilization has become
successful in terms of Environmental Justice in stopping a project (Aydin et al.
2017). For instance, in Costa Rica, despite criminalization of activists, the court
annulled the Crucitas mining project (EJatlas 2014e) and in El Salvador, despite
the murders, the struggles against El Dorado mining project lead to a new law
banning all types of metal mining activities in the country (EJatlas 2017c).
From the total cases accounted for, 34% end in a court decision favorable to
environmental defenders and 27% end in resolutions against them. The rest
remains unknown or yet to be decided. To analyze structural and cultural
violence, we focus on cases of failure, where visibly weak institutions decide
passively or actively against environmental defenders and environmental
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justice.
In Guatemala, despite the fact that the National Attorney General’s Office
declared the concession given to Perenco (a British–French company) illegal for
oil exploitation in Laguna del Tigre, the project continues (EJatlas 2015c). The
National Attorney argued that the concession was given within the Mayan
Biosphere Reserve, which is also part of a Ramsar protected area. Regardless,
in 2008 the Government promulgated FONPETROL, a law that guarantees the
concession to Perenco if “the economic terms are favorable to the State”.
Perenco, received the license for another 15 years more. This decision led to
resistance by 53 communities that were already suffering from spills (resulting
in water pollution, livestock, and crop losses); however, they were totally
ignored. In 2010, the government established the “Green Batallion”, around 250
soldiers to protect the Laguna del Tigre but also to protect the company’s
interests (EJatlas 2015c).
In addition, in Guatemala, the Polochic Valley case (EJatlas 2014f) shows how
structural and cultural violence are present. For years, the state used its force
and different powers (legislative, executive, and judicial), to repress local
people and facilitate extractive projects such as sugarcane and oil-palm
expansion. In 2011, the government participated actively in the process of
eviction of indigenous families of the Valley. A judge ordered the eviction of 14
communities at the request of an oligarchic family to plant sugarcane. The
Public Ministry (the state agency in charge of executing court orders, somehow
equivalent to an attorney general) participated in the evictions as well as
soldiers and national police. The oligarchic family pressured the military into
burning crops and they decided an exact date and time for the evictions. Around
800 families were violently evicted, the National Civil Police killed one
peasant, dozens of people were injured, and the homes and 1800 hectares of
staple crops were razed or destroyed. At the same time, the government, using
the media, accused organizations of being radicals that systematically
implemented illegal measures. In a way, this is a century old conflict. Local
communities have tried to recover the land they had lost from the beginning of
the colonial era, through liberal reforms and the development of the agro-export
model of cotton, banana, beef, and coffee farming.
The last example is located in Nicaragua, and it combines structural, cultural
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violence, and direct violence. In 1987, as part of the negotiations after many
years of internal conflict, the government created the Autonomous Regions of
the Atlantic (RAA-North and RAA-South) and conferred its management to the
indigenous Miskito. These lands are protected under Law 445, which recognizes
“indigenous communal property” and established that these lands are
inalienable, immune to seizure, and exempted from taxes. Nevertheless, the
increase of settlers willing to expand their businesses, wood smugglers, and
ranchers is threatening the local population’s livelihoods and leading to land
disputes over the last decades. Miskitos call for Tasba Pri which opposes the
notion of “economic development”. Tasba Pri means “Free Land” and the right
to continue their sustainable and ancestral activities such as agriculture and
fishing. In response of resistance, direct violence such as fire attacks,
kidnappings, tortures, and murders has been denounced by the Miskito (EJatlas
2017d). To escape, indigenous groups have crossed the border looking for
refuge in Honduras. In total, 3000 people have been displaced and at least 32
indigenous people killed. For Miskito—as for indigenous from the Polochic
Valley—these events hark back to another time when they battled the leftist
Sandinista government in a quest to keep their land in the civil war in the
1980s. Up to now, we have described examples of the Galtung’s triangle of
direct, structural, and cultural violence. In the following section, we identify
less visible and accumulative forms.
Slow violence
Human exposure to unknown and/or uncertain risks is reported in 14% of the
cases, deaths as health impacts in 24%, water pollution in 60%, and air
pollution, and soil contamination in 45%. Overall, these health and
environmental impacts are forms of violence to both humans and nature. Not
only environmental defenders but surrounding communities and future
generations are affected since hazardous substances can accumulate in future
bodies and threaten newborns before conception (Monge et al. 2007). Contrary
to direct or structural violence, data do not show remarkable differences
between countries. We see slow violence exemplified through cases of
monoculture—one of the most common type of conflict in Central America—
where pesticides in water, air, and soil slowly enter and accumulate in human
bodies and the environment. The resistance appears only after impacts become
visible, if at all. The next regional case in the “banana republics” (Costa Rica,
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Nicaragua, and Honduras) exemplifies this.
Nowadays, ex-banana workers are still mobilizing for compensation due to the
effects of exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a nematicide used to kill
worms on the banana plants owned by the United Fruit company during the
seventies. The chemical was produced by Dow Chemical and Shell Oil
Company (EJatlas 2016d, e, f). Years after exposure, surrounding communities
of the banana plantations realized an increasing amount of premature abortions,
birth defects, or congenital anomalies and an increasing number of sterile men.
Once the chemical was proven to be the cause of their health damages, banana
workers began a mobilization to ask for compensation. However, nowadays and
after decades of struggle (in national and international courts), most people
have not received compensation from the companies. The efforts to sue the
producers and users of the chemical have faced difficulties, unleashing a circle
of injustices due to the power asymmetries between the multinationals and the
local people in terms of scientific support, general information, relation with
state institutions, and lawyers. According to affected communities, there has
been a great failure in the institutional arrangements for enforcing liability for
damages to health.
Ecological violence
Ecological violence focuses on nature, but humans through protesting and
public campaigns play a role in making it visible. For instance, the ecological
effects of DBCP remain unknown, and conflicts have mainly focused on the
human impact. Ecological violence is generalized along the conflicts in the
region. Biodiversity loss, deforestation, and loss of vegetation cover are
reported as an impact in 80% of the cases, water pollution, decreasing water
quality and reduced ecological and hydrological connectivity in 60%, and air
pollution and soil contamination in 45%.
To draw on this dimension of violence, we focus on two key examples. The first
one is in Costa Rica, where “shark finning” became an illegal practice. Shark
finning involves catching the shark from the sea, cutting its fins off, and
throwing the rest of the body back to the sea, where the shark slowly dies. This
cruel practice is related to demand for fins in Asian markets, where dishes such
as shark fin soup are popular. Against this, national and international
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organizations and universities have strongly denounced it, leading to mass
mobilization, calling for new and stricter legislation but also encouraging
consumer boycott (EJatlas 2016g).
The second example of ecological violence (combined with extreme direct
violence against humans) is located in Guatemala, where a high degree of
pollution in La Pasión River was caused by the spillage of malathion, a
chemical used in oil-palm plantations (EJatlas 2015d). After the spillage, there
was a high impact on the aquatic ecosystem; neighboring villagers saw the river
full of dead fish and used the word “ecocide” in their public campaigns against
pollution of the river and claims for decontamination. The company (REPSA),
owner of the oil-palm plantations and responsible for the use of the chemical,
did not take actions. Concerned with this, Rigoberto Lima Choc—an inhabitant
from the community—denounced the company, and finally, the local
government took some actions against it. Days after, Rigoberto was found
murdered, but no investigations were carried out to find the culprits. According
to local community members, Rigoberto’s murdered was related to his decision
to denounce the company (EJatlas 2015c).
In this section, we have shown with specific cases from the EJAtlas how
different forms of violence are present and how some of them overlap. We
perceive how in some countries, violence is more visible than in others,
governments and companies are the main actors and how resistance is carried
out by local communities and environmental defenders. These cases indeed
support our hypothesis, the need for a wider, and more complex comprehension
of violence to address the study of environmental conflicts.
Discussion: the need for a multidimensional
violence approach
Causes of environmental conflicts are multifold. Empirical studies have shown
how the extraction of raw materials and energy production and supply has an
effect in the increase of environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier et al. 2010;
Muradian et al. 2012; Pérez-Rincón et al. 2017, this feature). This argument is
highly consistent with our data, as the majority of the conflicts are related to
mining, hydropower supply and the expansion of monocultures. One difference
with other regions in Latin America (Pérez-Rincón et al. 2017, this feature;
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Teran 2017, this feature) is that conflicts related to oil and gas exploration and
extraction which lead to “petro-violence” (Watts 2001) are less common in
Central America.
Environmental conflicts are also a result of structural and cultural dynamics; for
instance, the unequal distribution of economic benefits and environmental
consequences influenced by coloniality, racism, class and gender inequalities
(Martinez-Alier and O’Connor 1996), clashes of values over nature (Martinez-
Alier 2009), or lack of participation and the non-recognition of communal
institutions (Schlosberg 2013; Walter and Urkidi 2017). Environmental conflicts
can arise suddenly or be a result of a long social cost-shifting process (Kapp
1950; Teran 2017, this feature). Regardless of the causes, different forms of
violence appear and overlap throughout environmental conflicts.
Central American data report incidences of murders, evictions, and tortures;
however, these are not isolated cases around the world (Del Bene et al. this
feature; Global Witness 2015). Our findings go hand in hand with Global
Witness reports, highlighting Guatemala and Honduras—countries with the
poorest social and economic indicators in the region—as the most directly
violent (Global Witness 2016). Why and under which conditions some conflicts
are more directly violent than others deserves more attention. The historical
conjuncture (Peluso and Watts 2001) and differences in the democracy index
(Van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014) indicators might give further insight.
Overall, it is a constant that environmental defender murders remain impune
(Global Witness 2016) and our data show how governmental institutions are not
neutral actors in this, not only as they fail to ensure justice by passively
ignoring to investigate murders, but also by taking part in evictions such as the
conflict in the Polochic Valley (EJatlas 2014f) and by not respecting their own
laws such as the Miskito case (EJatlas 2017d). Weak institutions and strong
elites in some Central American countries (Bull 2014) are certainly factors to
explain how environmental injustices are produced and reproduced.
Overall, powerless social groups such as indigenous, afro-descendants, and
peasants from rural areas are the most impacted, the same groups who were
impacted by internal wars decades ago (Kay 2001; Sibrián and Van der Borgh
2014; Mingorría 2017). For instance, Miskito in Nicaragua relates their
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resistance today to their past struggles. In Guatemala, Wayland and Kuniholm
(2015) show how the memory of the war plays a role in the social cohesion to
resist against mining and hydroelectric dams.
Despite the region’s internal differences, instances of ecological and slow
violence are more homogenous. Historical factors or social and economic
indicators do not seem to be related to these forms of violence. Costa Rica—
with a high level of democracy and with a peaceful history—is one the largest
consumers of pesticides. This issue is leading to high levels of diseases in rural
settings (Monge et al. 2007) of which the DBCP episode was a tragic early
example (Thrupp 1991). Even if there is not an immediate killer, these biocides
(Carson 1962) or “slow murders” (Narain 2007) are culprits of slow violence
(Nixon 2011) due to the daily contamination and the slow deaths they provoke.
However, in the environmental conflicts studied, resistance is organized once
the impacts in bodies have been felt and not before or during the slow violence.
Nowadays, even though the DBCP was banned, it is still causing impacts on
human health (Bohme 2015). However, the impact it is causing on nature
remains unknown. Environmental conflict cases in Central America also show
how ecological violence can be manifested twofold; it can be both slow (daily
and slow contamination, or loss of wildlife in rivers cutoff by dams) or direct
(by a specific action such as cutting the shark fins).
Furthermore, different forms of violence can overlap in a single conflict, and in
addition, one form of violence can lead to another. Due to the protest against
ecological violence in Rio La Pasión, Rigoberto Lima Choc was shot dead. In
addition, banana workers still protesting for compensation have faced structural
violence on the weak institutional systems that slowly ignored their need for a
compensation (Boix 2007; Bohme 2015).
In addition, Central America shows the key role of women as environmental
defenders. Berta Cáceres was one key example, but there are many more in the
region and around the world (Martinez-Alier and Navas 2017). Studies on
gender and violence in environmental conflicts become relevant for this debate,
more specifically women who deploy a twofold resistance against extractive
companies and against patriarchal structures in their own homes and
communities (Shiva 1994; Veuthey and Gerber 2010; Jenkins 2017).
15/03/2018, 10*31e.Proofing
Page 21 of 31http://eproofing.springer.com/journals_v2/printpage.php?token=EhvUyEC9jVgoismpWNRL59FDcdvsFr2GsIv7ZulRtIqMilxXA0cTfA
Finally, most environmental defenders not only defend nature, because they
depend on it, but also because their own values are congruent with this defense
(Martinez-Alier 2002, 2009). Concepts such as “Tasba Pri” in Nicaragua closely
relate with the Andean notion of Sumak Kawsay (Acosta 2013), and can lead to
a wider discussion about not only cultural violence (the use of language to
legitimize violence), but also the colonial, racist violence imposed by the
dominant western narrative of “development” (Escobar 2011), where
indigenous peoples are depicted as “backward” and their communal institutions
are seen as “obstacles to progress and development”.
In this article, we aimed at viewing violence from a wide perspective, since a
narrow view of violence will lead to misinterpretations of how violence
operates in different countries and political and economic contexts. To approach
this, we propose a multidimensional violence approach that we defined as “a
focus in which violence is defined as an action or a process that appears in
visible and unseen forms against humans, nature, and its sustainable relation”.
In this article, multidimensional violence is an aggregate of direct violence,
cultural, structural, slow, and ecological violence but other forms might also be
added (and some might be missing) depending on the context in which
environmental conflicts are embedded. For instance, other forms can be added
such as gender violence in environmental conflicts. In addition, the forms of
violence that are mentioned can be more complex; for instance, direct violence
can be subdivided in different degrees of intensities (one murder or 90 murders
makes a difference). In addition, ecological violence can be both slow and
direct. Furthermore, one dimension of violence can lead to the other and
resistance can be deployed before or after one of these forms of violence is
applied.
Conclusion
Drawing on literature in political ecology and environmental conflicts. On
studies of violence and rich empirical evidence from 95 environmental conflicts
in Central America recorded in the EJAtlas. We have shown how different
dimensions of violence appear and overlap in different historical, political and
economic contexts. Violence in its different dimensions becomes visible due to
movements of resistance and claims by environmental defenders in
environmental conflicts. Regional and worldwide databases fed both by
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academics and activists are also useful to increase their visibility. However,
there are dimensions of violence that are manifested in these conflicts that still
remain unseen—even for environmental defenders. Daily violence such as slow
violence and violence against nature might not be crude types of violence but
are also threatening livelihoods, humans, and nature, even though resistance is
only deployed once the impacts have been felt. Violence goes beyond individual
environmental defenders to impact communities as a whole, nature itself and
the human–nature interaction. In this article, we have proposed the need for a
multidimensional violence approach (encompassing “slow”, structural, cultural,
and ecological forms of violence, and not only direct quick episodes of physical
violence) as a tool for a wider conceptualization of violence for analysis of
environmental conflicts.
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Environmental defenders are people who take peaceful action to protect land or
environmental rights, whether in their own personal capacity or professionally (Global Witness
2017).
Due to the large sample size, these conflicts give a reliable picture of the environmental
conflicts in the region. But, with a growing number of cases, some results might change.
The term was first mention in the novel “Cabbages and Kings” (Henry 1904) to describe the
imaginary country of Anchuria inspired by the author’s experiences in Honduras.
People involve themselves in the regional struggles as activists or academics or both. We got
in touch with Centro Humboldt and Nicaraguan Social Movement (Nicaragua); Panama
Ecological Voices (Radio Temblor), the Environmental Advocacy Center (CIAM) and Alianza
para un Mejor Darién (AMEDAR) (Panamá), the Salvadoran Center for Appropriate
Technologies CESTA - Friends of the Earth; Justice and Freedom Movement (Honduras),
Institute of Agrarian and Rural Studies IDEAR-CONGCOOP, the Central American Institute of
Fiscal Studies in Guatemala and Madre Selva.
The data base has received contributions of scholars and activists representing a mixture of
academic and grassroots organizations whose names appear in the last part of the data sheet.
Ejatlas classifies conflicts according to ten mutually exclusive primary categories (Nuclear
power, Mineral Ore Extraction, Water management, Biomass and land conflicts, Fossil Fuels
and Climate Justice, Infrastructure and Built Environment, Waste management, Biodiversity
conflicts, Tourism, and Industrial and Utilities conflicts). There are many more secondary
categories. For instance, under Nuclear Power conflicts (of which, incidentally, there are none
from Central America in the EJAtlas), there could be conflicts classified under Uranium
Mining, Nuclear Power Plants, or Nuclear Waste Disposal).
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